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I. INTRODUCTION
1

By imposing on counsel “up-the-ladder” reporting of corporate mis2
conduct, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has undertaken to delineate the relationship of lawyers to their corporate clients as a function of
corporate policing rather than as traditional counseling, advocating, or advising. In the private sector, even after the recent revisions, the American
Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) R.
1.13(b) leaves to the corporate attorney the resolution of the ethical quandary regarding disclosure of known misconduct or violations of fiduciary
duty up the corporate ladder: corporate counsel’s decision should be guided
by the organization’s best interest and should be based on counsel’s reason3
able belief. Section 307 of SOX and related Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) rules, on the other hand, at least for public corporations,
resolved the uncertainty: based on “credible evidence” of “material violations” of securities laws, when there is a breach of fiduciary duty or other

* 2007 J.D. at Florida International University (FIU), member of the FIU College of Law’s Law
Review, holds a Master in Business Administration & Certificate in International Business from FIU,
and a Doctorate in Jurisprudence from the University of Bologna (Italy). Member of the Florida Bar and
the Bologna Bar. Many thanks are extended to Professors Jerry W. Markham and Matthew C. Mirow for
their patience and support with this project. Also, thanks are extended to Law Librarian Marisol Floren
for her untiring assistance.
1
Senator Edwards’ vernacular, short for the expression “up the corporate ladder” which refers to
the chain of responsibility and command in corporations and other business enterprises, commonly used
in most cited sources discussing SOX.
2
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28 and 29 U.S.C.A).
3
Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, in
ENRON CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, 571, 583-84 (Foundation Press, 2004). After the
2003 revisions, ABA Rule 1.13 incorporates the SOX approach, albeit in permissive terms. See A.B.A
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (b) (2005) (“Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is
not necessary … the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization.”).
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4

violation, the duty to report up within the organization is clear. Even
5
though up-the-ladder reporting per se “does not break any new ground”
and has been considered an appropriate response by corporate counsel, the
6
7
SEC and the courts, and the MRPC before and after the 2003 revisions,
the new rule, which makes up-the-ladder reporting a federal mandate for
corporate internal and external counsel, creates an abundance of tensions
and challenges going to the very core of the attorney-client relationship,
some of which are reviewed in Section II.
SOX is a response to a United States (U.S.) problem of corporate governance and accountability, but its global implications did not escape domestic and international commentators and practitioners. Since 1,300 for8
eign corporations list securities on U.S. exchanges, a heated debate over
the meaning of SOX provisions and the effect of their controversial, yet
seemingly contemplated extraterritorial application ensued. After touching
upon the extraterritorial reach of SOX, Section III examines the peculiar
uncertainties and interpretive considerations involved in deciphering and
complying with the federal reporting rules for the foreign lawyer. This Section next examines how the reporting provision may affect foreign lawyers
in light of fundamental differences in general principles of law, specific
foreign legislation, conflicting professional responsibility rules, corporate
structure and governance, and the role of corporate lawyers within it. Lastly, this section reviews different approaches foreign countries have adopted
to transition to systems of corporate governance directed at containing the
4
Cramton, supra note 3, at 585; 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2003) (stating
that “the attorney shall report … forthwith”); Id. § 205.2(e) (defining evidence of material violation to
mean “credible evidence based upon which it would be unreasonable under the circumstances, for a
prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has
occurred, is ongoing or is about to occur”); Id. § 202.2(d) (defining breach of fiduciary duty broadly as a
breach arising under federal, state statute, or at common law).
5
Peter J. Henning, White Collar Criminal Law in Comparative Perspective: The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002: Sarbanes-Oxley Act 307 and Corporate Counsel: Who Better to Prevent Corporate Crime,
8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 323, 340 (2004).
6
See S.E.C. v. Nat’l Student Marketing Corp., 457 F.Supp.682 (D.D.C. 1978) (denying the
injunction and relying on the corporate bar to make sure that their conduct comports with the law, but
stating that the attorney’s silence was breach of his duty to speak and lent the appearance of legitimacy
to the transaction); In Re Carter and Johnson, 22 S.E.C Docket 292, WL 384414 (1981) (finding that
lawyers were used as a shield to protect against the pressures of the banks to get disclosure, which
amounts to a perversion of the lawyer-client relationship, and that no lawyer may continue in such a
situation to recommend disclosure when he knows the recommendations are not being heeded).
7
Before the 2003 revisions, A.B.A MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 did not clearly
establish an up-the-ladder reporting mandate as a way to deal with “known” misconduct by officers,
employees or other people associated with the organization, stating only that the attorney “shall proceed
as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.” A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.13 (b) (2001). The Rule then suggested that, in deciding how to proceed, the attorney
consider the seriousness and consequences of the violation, the scope of representation, the responsibility and the motivation of the person, the policies of the organization, among other factors. Id.
8
Cramton, supra note 3, at 585.

2008]

Reporting Rules for U.S. and International Lawyers

463

underlying causes of the corporate scandals that have plagued most of the
industrialized world, with a view to the role reserved to the corporate lawyer in the process.
Section IV, after exploring the propriety of charging the corporate
lawyer—and even more so, the foreign corporate lawyer—with corporate
policing duties, attempts to create a vademecum for the foreign corporate
lawyer to steer clear of inadvertently trampling over SOX-created additional responsibilities with respect to reporting and vigilance of potential corporate wrongdoing.
In conclusion, although refining and clarifying lawyers’ responsibilities and duties in corporate settings may be desirable and even necessary, it
should not be regarded as a preventative remedy against future corporate
fiascos. Deputizing corporate lawyers as watchdogs on behalf of a federal
agency with prosecutorial authority may be appealing as a wake up call to
the profession, particularly when a few of its formerly respected members
fell asleep at the switch. On the other hand, lightly pondered federalization
of the rules of professional conduct erodes not only client confidentiality
and the foundation of the attorney–client relationship, but even more dramatically, shakes the foundation of the adversarial system by reconfiguring
the balance of power between government and individual in favor of the
government, a structural flaw not addressed by the SEC rules. A norm that
creates multiple tensions and uncertainties for the domestic bar, while not
demonstrably improving transparency of corporate governance or improving the opportunities to detect or prevent corporate misconduct, is not fit for
export and should not be exported. At this point, short of creating exceptions for the foreign bar altogether, instead of retreating from the quagmire
of SOX blanket applicability with SEC rules that still leave areas of confusion and uncertainty, it might be prudent to recast the federal professional
responsibility rule in permissive terms, and consider it an aspirational
norm—at least until tested with the domestic bar.
II. FEDERAL DEPUTIZATION: A DILEMMA FOR U.S. CORPORATE ATTORNEYS
SOX up-the-ladder reporting rules were ostensibly created to increase
public accountability and transparency, and to improve corporate gover9
nance. They, however, impose on corporate counsel for corporations listed
with the SEC an inquisitorial, if not prosecutorial, role they are likely not
trained for and most definitively not placed on corporate payroll for, either

9
See Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Symposium, Up the Ladder and
Beyond: The New Professional Standards for Lawyers Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Legal and Ethical
Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 728 (2004).
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10

as internal or external counsel.
The SOX up-the-ladder reporting requirement (especially in its originally proposed form, including the “noisy
withdrawal” later placed in abeyance), as part of the SOX’s concerted effort
to restore investors’ confidence in the market, reflects the presumably widespread belief, to the extent that the expression of Congressional will can be
taken as a reflection of the beliefs of the constituency, that lawyers were, to
11
some extent, responsible for the recent spate of scandals. Although the
primary targets of the federal intervention to improve corporate governance
were accountants and corporate officers, lawyers were included under the
facially, not far-fetched assumption that the elaborate frauds that were perpetrated in the Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Healthsouth, and other all too famous headline-grabbing financial disasters, could not have occurred without
12
the lawyers’ active help or at least their acquiescence.
In an ever more complex corporate world, lawyers have increasingly
become an integral part of corporate decision-making and strategic planning in the business world, as opposed to serving only in the development
13
of the purely legal aspects of individual transactions. Considering this
trend, it is not surprising that Congress, while regulating executives and
accountants, took an interest in defining the position, responsibility, and
professional duties of a player whose importance in the corporate context is
increasing and evolving. On the other hand, reacting to the unprecedented
threat to the integrity of capital markets, the federal government intervened
to a heretofore unthinkable extent in regulating attorneys’ professional responsibility in the business context, imposing on lawyers general watchdog
duties not only regarding securities violations but also “other violations” or
14
“breaches of fiduciary duty.”
This Section highlights the traditional characteristics of the lawyerclient relationship as they apply to the client-corporation. The Section then
examines the rules introduced by SOX that affect the practice of corporate
lawyers, with particular attention to Section 307 and related SEC Rules.
Further, this Section draws a comparison with MRPC, identifying conflicts
between the overlapping application of SEC rules and the MRPC. Finally,
the analysis identifies a sea-change in the role of the lawyer through the
10 Jason Thompson, The Paradoxical Nature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as it Relates to the Practitioner Representing a Multinational Corporation, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 265, 269 (2006)(stating
that the SEC enlisted domestic and foreign attorneys to resolve the practical difficulty of investigating
whether companies are observing proper practices); see also Henning, supra note 5.
11 Simon M. Lorne, An Issue-Annotated Version of the SOX Rules for Lawyer Conduct, 1464
PRAC. L. INST. 393, 402 (2005).
12 Id.
13 See Henning, supra note 5, at 360 (noting that lawyers are a fact of life, especially in publicly
traded corporations, that they become involved in most steps during business decisions providing advice
in multiple areas of law).
14 15 U.S.C. 7245(1) (2002).
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federalization of professional responsibility standards. This change threatens the independence of the profession, and compromises the integrity of
the adversarial system. At the same time, this sweeping change does little
to correct the conditions that allowed corporate governance failures, while
it produces several undesired and unintended consequences of its own.
A. Lawyers in the Corporate World
Lawyers work on behalf of their clients as employees, agents, or independent contractors. Like other professionals, lawyers bring to the relationship special expertise which leads clients to defer to their professional
15
judgment and to follow their recommendations. However, unlike other
professionals, lawyers have legal authority to make certain legal decisions,
and the clout to pressure clients into accepting their advice, especially with
16
respect to illegal or potentially illegal conduct. SOX has expanded the
ability of lawyers, at least those “appearing and practicing” before the SEC,
to persuade, force, or even override their clients by giving them power not
only to withdraw, but to reveal confidential information—a more direct tool
to persuade clients to act within the the law or to correct illegal action, at
17
least in public corporate settings.
1. Confidentiality and Attorney-Client Privilege
Tensions between opposing values are not a new theme in the professional responsibility of corporate lawyers. The MRPC attempts to strike a
balance between the competing values of protecting clients and protecting
society. “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure
18
is permitted” under specific circumstances. At the outset, the rules of professional conduct recognize that confidentiality is at the basis of the attorney-client relationship, and endeavor to provide a framework for communication between lawyer and client based on trust and candor to allow the
advocate to obtain accurate and complete information, and to enable him to
19
provide competent assistance to resolve legal problems. Since the lawyer
is duty-bound not to reveal information “relating to the representation” the
client is “encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate with him
fully and frankly even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject mat-

15 Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules Work? 47 B.C. L. REV.
455, 456 (2006).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 458.
18 A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2005).
19 See id.; Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 2; Id. R. 1.13; Id. R. 1.13; Id. R. 2.1; Id. R. 1.1; Id. R. 1.3.
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20

ter.” The lawyer needs this information to provide effective representation
and to give legal advice, including advice to refrain from wrongful conduct
21
when necessary. The client will not be able to express himself candidly if
22
he is in fear that his advocate may turn against him. One scholar has compellingly, albeit critically, observed that confidentiality is treated by the bar
23
as a constitutional norm alongside with loyalty.
There is, however, a tension between the client’s need for confidentiality and society’s need for transparency and accountability. Confidentiality is
reinforced by the evidentiary tool of the attorney-client privilege recognized
by the Supreme Court as a fundamental tenet of representation and promoting the “public interests in the observance of the law and the administration
24
of justice.” Society’s need for transparency and accountability is reflected
in the exceptions to both the duty of confidentiality and the evidentiary protection of the attorney-client privilege which allow, or even mandate in spe25
cific circumstances, disclosure of otherwise confidential information. As
will be further discussed below, this tension has been addressed by the
MRPC by means of a solution admittedly shrouded in ambiguity. However,
this ambiguity is not exclusively due to the reluctance of the profession, but
also is due to the recognition that a bright-line policing solution may irreparably compromise the partisan role of the advocate, while demanding of
the lawyer the superhuman task of contemporaneously serving two masters
with opposing interests in an adversarial system, and then offer one’s repu26
tation to the easy attack of hindsight bias.
The importance of maintaining confidentiality, loyalty to the client,
and the proper role of the lawyer in an adversarial system is not a legal profession concept that receives widespread appreciation by the uninitiated in
general, much less in the corporate context; therefore, if SOX is to be taken,
in a somewhat simplified view, as the expression of popular will, it is no
surprise that its enactment may have given short shrift to these aspects of

20

Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 2.
Kaveh Noorishad, Current Development 2004-2005: The Sarbanes Oxley Act and In-House
Legal Counsel: Suggestions for Viable Compliance, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1042 (Summer
2005).
22 See Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (stating that the purpose of the lawyer-client
privilege is to encourage clients’ full disclosure to their lawyer, recognizing that “[a]s a practical matter,
if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in
his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.”).
23 Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1236, 1244 (2003) (criticizing the fact that confidentiality shapes the interpretation of other
norms of lawyer’s conduct and noting that state law requires that ethics rules be subordinate to state law,
not the other way around).
24 Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
25 A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2005).
26 Cramton, supra note 3, at 587.
21
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the profession, especially when some voices from its very ranks were airing
27
the same concerns. As will be further discussed below, client confidentiality is re-defined in the context of listed companies by up-the-ladder reporting rules, and by the whistleblower provision.
2. Confidentiality and the Corporation
It is important to define who the client is in the corporate context,
since in a situation of confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege belongs
to the client. Is it the Board of Directors, management, the shareholders, or
the corporation? In Upjohn v. United States, the Supreme Court noted this
dilemma, rejected the control group test, which would afford protection
only to information flowing between top executives and corporate attorneys, and indicated that the applicability of the attorney-client privilege
28
should be decided on a case-by-case basis. The Court held that the privilege could apply to communication by both middle and lower level employees, arguably extending the protection of the privilege with respect to
lawyer-client communication in corporations, since the corporation is an
29
artificial creature of the law. The MRPC takes a similar approach by
clearly identifying the organization as the client, and stating that communication with employees or other “constituents” in their organizational capaci30
ty is confidential.
Similarly, § 205.3(a) specifies that attorneys representing issuers owe
their duty to the issuer, meaning the organization, not to the officers or em31
ployees that the attorney normally works or interacts with. However,
based on the SEC Rules, confidentiality is apparently redefined by implication to apply only to the information which lies outside of the mandatory
32
up-the-ladder reporting. A paradoxical situation is thus created: the issuer,
through its management, determines the scope of representation; all lawyerclient interactions are perforce with the individual executives, managers or
employees, as the representatives of the corporation. In this setting at least,
27 Lorne, supra note 11, at 403. The proposal for Federal regulation of lawyers was instigated by
law professors. Id.; see, e.g. Koniak, supra note 23 (describing her contribution to the proposal by
Senator Edwards and charging that the bar legal vision of what the law is “functions in the day to day
life of a substantial segment of the bar to nullify state law.”).
28 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389-90.
29 Id. However, Upjohn is not consistently followed in state courts. See Alexander C. Black,
Annotation, What Corporate Communications are Entitled to Attorney-Client Privilege-Modern Cases,
27 A.L.R. 5th 76 (1995).
30 See A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (a) (2005); Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 2 (specifying that the constituents of the organization are not ipso facto the lawyer’s clients, and that the lawyer
may not disclose to them information relating to the representation of the organization except as expressly or impliedly authorized to carry out the representation or otherwise permitted by the rules).
31 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(a) (2003).
32 See id. §205.3(b)(1) (clarifying that the act of up the ladder reporting does not constitute revealing clients confidences or secrets or otherwise protected information).
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the sacrosanct confidentiality norm is reduced to little more than an empty
shell. While the line of demarcation between the corporation and senior
33
management may seem clear, in practice it blurs. Indeed, it blurs even as it
relates to in-house counsel and senior management, against whom the attorney is expected to turn in, carrying out his duty to report up-the-ladder
the very group or individual who most likely hired him, to whom he may
34
report daily, and from whom he receives his compensation check. The
question, therefore, is how many attorneys are willing to risk their jobs or
lose face with the Board based on the belief, even though founded on credible evidence and satisfying a reasonable likelihood standard (as further explored below), that a violation has been committed, or even less concretely,
35
may be about to be committed? In practice, the first time the in-house attorney or the outside attorney report up the corporate ladder is likely to be
36
the last. Conversely,, in the context of the corporation, up-the-ladder reporting is considered to be completely consistent with client confidentially
in that it appraises the decision-makers of the need to take internal correc37
tive action.
3. Corporate Lawyer-Counselor
38

The corporate lawyer is not merely a transaction engineer, but retains
39
his role of advisor as expressed in MRPC R. 2.1. The lawyer “shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law, but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be rele40
vant to the client’s situation.” The attorney is therefore urged to provide
41
the client more than the narrow legal terms, to offer perspective on the
implication of a course of conduct, to help the client clarify his objectives
by weighing the short term advantages against the long term costs of a pro42
posed course of action. In his role as advisor, the lawyer is expected to
offer straightforward legal advice even when it goes against what the client
33

Noorishad, supra note 21, at 1045.
Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1051.
37 Timothy P. Glynn, Symposium, Federal Privileges in the 21st Century: One Privilege to Rule
them All? Some Post Sarbanes-Oxley and Other Reflections on a Federally Codified Attorney-Client
Privilege, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 597, 611-12 (2004) (opining that even noisy withdrawal would not
discourage candor promoted by attorney-client privilege and would not significantly expand existing
withdrawal obligations).
38 Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line in the
Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1089, 1137 (2006).
39 A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2005).
40 Id.
41 See id. R. 2.1 cmt. 2.
42 Bost, supra note 38.
34
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43

wants to hear. Giving legal advice perforce engages a moral discourse,
since ethical and moral considerations are always involved in discussing
rights, duties, and the consequences of one’s conduct vis-à-vis third par44
ties.
In a somewhat idealized and slightly anachronistic picture of the
attorney-client relationship, they each depend and rely on one another for
honesty and candor to develop, in conjunction, the right solution, not only
in terms of being prudent and wise in the specific situation, but also in the
45
sense of being morally and ethically correct. Even in less than ideal situations, in exercising the function of counselor, the lawyer most likely will
and should engage in moral discourse, which presumes a system of values
and beliefs, to a large extent shared by lawyer and client, that the lawyer
can draw upon to steer the client in the morally correct direction.
Many agree that, whether the lawyers were victims, bystanders or
knowing agents, at the center of the corporate scandals that spurred the federal professional responsibility intervention, there was a general failure of
46
moral compass. The question is whether it is even plausible to posit that
the Federal rules can succeed by fiat, where the existing rules have arguably
not measured up, in the mission of ultimately changing the behavior of corporations to conform to the federal ideal of corporate morality using lawyers as their roving investigation and enforcement tools.
4. SOX for Lawyers: Up-the-Ladder Reporting
Several provisions of SOX may affect lawyers in corporate settings.
For example, Section 303 makes it unlawful “for any officer or director of
an issuer, or any other person acting under the direction thereof, to take any
action to fraudulently . . . mislead any independent public or certified accountant . . . for the purpose of rendering such financial statements mate47
rially misleading.” Another provision of SOX affecting lawyers is Section
806, which provides whistle-blower protection for fraud-related communi-

43 A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1 (2005) (specifying that the attorney
“should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that ..[it] will be unpalatable to the
client.”).
44 Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (“It is proper for a lawyer to refer to moral and ethical considerations in giving
advice.”).
45 Bost, supra note 38, at 1138. For a skeptical perspective on the relationship between lawyer
and client in practice, see Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra note 9, at 815 (noting that the notions of
trust and candor in the lawyer-client relationship is surrounded by a great deal of romanticism while
studies reveal mistrust and suspicion where clients are unwilling to reveal sensitive and embarrassing
facts).
46 Bost, supra note 38 at 1139.
47 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, §303 (2002).
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cation by an employee of a public corporation, which presumably applies
48
also to those employees who are lawyers.
However, Section 307, the provision specifically directed at the corporate bar, has generated the biggest reaction by the profession. Section 307
directs the SEC to set minimum standards of professional conduct for attor49
neys representing issuers before it. It requires attorneys to report evidence
of material violations of securities law, breaches of fiduciary duty, and similar violations to the Chief Legal Officer (CLO) or to the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of the issuer, and to report to the audit committee if the CLO
50
or the CEO fails to respond. Section 307 and SEC Rule 205 place attorneys “appearing and practicing” in front of the SEC “in representation of an
51
issuer” within the purview of the SEC’s own rules of professional conduct.
An attorney is considered to be “appearing and practicing” before the SEC
when he transacts any business with the SEC; represents an issuer in an
administrative proceeding or in connection with any SEC investigation,
inquiry, information request, or subpoena; or gives advice on securities laws
or Commission rules on any document, information or statement he knows
52
will be filed with the SEC.
Attorneys who engage in the conducts indicated outside the context of
providing legal services to an issuer with whom they have an attorney53
client relationship, and “non-appearing” foreign attorneys are exempted.
Commentators have concluded that the provision has a broad reach cover54
ing inside and outside counsel, both domestic and foreign. Attorneys serving in legal departments (even those working in a non-public subsidiary of a
48 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, §806 (2002) (stating that “no public company . . . may
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee
in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the employee (1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in the investigation which the
employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of . . . any provision of Federal law relating to
fraud against shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to or the investigation is
conducted by (A) a Federal, regulatory or law enforcement agency; (B) any member of Congress or any
Committee of Congress; or (C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee or such other
person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover or terminate misconduct;
or (2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in , or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to
be filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating to an alleged violation . . . .” ).
49 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
50 Id.
51 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2003) (indicating that the standards supplement existing applicable
standards of professional conduct where the attorney practices, and do not limit the ability of any jurisdiction to impose additional obligations—albeit in conformity with the rules—but specifying that
“[w]here the standards of a state or other United States jurisdiction . . . conflict with this part, this part
shall govern.”).
52 See id. § 205.2(a)(1).
53 Id. § 205.2(a)(2)(i) and (ii) (2002); Id. § 205.2(j) (defining foreign attorneys).
54 J. Curtis Greene, Note, New Regulations for Lawyers: The SEC Final Rule for Professional
Conduct in the Wake of Sarbanes Oxley: Challenges for Foreign Attorneys, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 807, 829 (2004).
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public company) of an issuer or providing legal services in the context of an
attorney-client relationship are included in the purview of the rules, but
55
attorneys employed by a public company in a non-legal capacity are not.
It is noteworthy that an attorney-client relationship can be found even
56
though there is no retainer or agreement for the provision of legal services.
However, employees of an issuer who, even though they may be licensed
attorneys, are not engaged as such but employed in different capacities,
such as compliance officer, business development executive, or employee
57
benefit administrator, are not subject to the rules.
The attorney who becomes aware of credible evidence of a material
58
violation, defined as a violation of “applicable United States Federal or
state securities law, a material breach of fiduciary duty arising under United
States Federal or state law or a similar violation of United States Federal or
state law” committed by an officer, director or employee of the issuer, is
59
required to report such evidence to the issuer CLO or CEO. A violation of
60
foreign law does not constitute a material violation under the Act. Evidence includes only credible evidence based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, “for a prudent and competent attorney not
to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has oc61
curred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.” The determination of whether
there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that a material violation has
occurred or is about to occur is fact sensitive, involving the attorney’s skills,
background, previous contacts and experience with the particular client, the
time limitations under which he is working, and the availability of addition62
al counsel for consultation. Therefore, mandatory reporting up the corporate ladder, as indicated by the expression “reasonably likely,” is triggered
only when the attorney, in weighing the evidence available to him, concludes that it is more likely than not that a violation has occurred, is occur63
ring, or is about to occur. The trigger to instigate reporting within the
ranks of the client corporation, and to encourage consideration of the con64
duct thus identified within the organization is relatively low. The rules
indicate that, in performing “up-the-ladder reporting,” the attorney “does
not reveal client confidences or secrets or privileged or otherwise protected
55

Id.
Id.
57 Stanley Keller, SEC’s Attorney Professional Conduct Rules, THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, Vol. 2, Section III 1, 3 (2004).
58 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
59 17 C.F.R § 205.3(b)(1) (2003); Id. § 205.2(i).
60 Keller, supra note 57, at 5.
61 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2003); Keller, supra note 57, at 5.
62 Greene, supra note 54, at 836.
63 Id.
64 Keller, supra note 57, at 5.
56
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information related to the attorney’s representation of an issuer.” Once
subject to the rules, it is not necessary that the information be obtained in
connection to the representation or that the information relates to the representation, for the duty to report to be triggered, but time-wise, the duty to
66
report is likely to be considered at an end when the representation ends.
Reporting to the CLO, in turn, triggers an obligation on her part to
make a reasonable inquiry into the evidence to determine whether a viola67
tion is occurring, has occurred, or is about to occur. The CLO must then
report back to the attorney if she concludes in the negative, or cause the
issuer to take all reasonable steps to adopt an “appropriate response,” including remedial measures or sanctions to stop or prevent the violation, if
68
she concludes in the positive. Last, the CLO must advise the reporting
69
attorney of the issuer’s response. If the CLO fails to provide an appropriate response to the reported violation within a reasonable time, the attorney
is required to report up-the-ladder to the issuer audit committee or other
committee of independent directors or to the full Board of Directors
70
(BOD). The attorney could also bypass the CLO and go directly above her
71
if he believes that it would be futile to report below.
Once he receives an appropriate and timely response to his report, the
72
attorney is in compliance with the reporting requirements of the rule. If he
is not satisfied with the response received from the CLO, the attorney must
73
explain his reasons. The debate is open as to the meaning of appropriate
74
response, even though the rules provide some guidance. The debate is
likewise open regarding what constitutes reasonable time for the response
75
to be provided, as well as what exactly is the obligation of the attorney
65

17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2003).
Keller, supra note 57, at 5.
67 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2) (2003).
68 Id.
69 Id. (the rule makes the CLO responsible to adopt all appropriate steps to cause the issuer to
undertake an appropriate response).
70 Id. § 205.3(b)(4).
71 Id. (bypassing reporting under §205(b)(1), the report to the CLO and CFO, and mandating
reporting by the attorney directly to the BOD audit committee, or if the issuer does not have an audit
committee, directly to the BOD).
72 Id. § 205.3(b)(8) (the attorney who receives an appropriate and timely response “need do
nothing more . . . with respect to his or her report”).
73 Id. § 205.3(b)(9) (the attorney who is not satisfied with the response must explain his reasons
for dissatisfaction to the CLO, CEO or Board of Directors).
74 See id. § 205.2(b); See Keller, supra note 57, at 7 (stating that appropriate response, one of the
most difficult concepts, should cause the attorney to form the reasonable belief that (i) no material
violation has occurred, is ongoing or about to occur; (ii) the issuer has taken appropriate remedial measure, or (iii) the issuer has directed an attorney to review the evidence the evidence and has substantially
implemented recommendations made, or has advised the attorney that a colorable defense can be asserted. The attorney’s determination as to whether the response was in fact appropriate has to be reasonable in light of the circumstances.).
75 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3) (2003).
66
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who is not satisfied after he has reached the end of the ladder for internal
reporting, besides the mere explanation of his reasons indicated by the
76
rules. In practical terms, after reporting, the lawyer may not face this thorny dilemma, as he is likely to have been eliminated from the issuer’s payroll or any retainer agreement may come to an abrupt end.
In addition, as under MRPC, the attorney is allowed to reveal without
the consent of the client corporation confidential information relating to the
representation, to the extent that he believes it is necessary, in three instances:
1) in connection with an investigation or with litigation where the attorney’s compliance with the rules is at issue (referred to as the “self
defense” disclosure); or
2) to the SEC, where the attorney reasonably believes disclosure
would prevent the client from committing a material violation likely to
cause substantial injury to the financial interests or property of the issuer or investors or an illegal act; or
3) to rectify the consequences of a material violation to further
77
which the attorney’s services were used.
5. ABA Rules and State Rules
The ABA MRPC that the states use as guidance for their own rules of
professional conduct, even after the recent changes, adopts a fundamentally
different approach to the issue of client confidentiality and the attorney’s
78
duty regarding client confidences. As noted above, a fundamental principle in the attorney-client relationship is that the lawyer must not reveal
information relating to the representation unless the client gives informed
79
consent. Even when the MRPC recognizes situations where confidentiality may have to be breached, most of the time the choice is left to the lawyer.
Most provisions, such as the crime-fraud exception, center on permissiveness. “A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent the client
from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in sub80
stantial injury to the financial interests or property of another . . . .”
In
addition, pursuant to MRPC R. 1.2,

76 After the originally proposed “noisy withdrawal” was not adopted, and reporting to the SEC or
others is worded permissively. See id. § 205.3(b)(9) and (10) (whistleblower protection provision).
77 Id. § 205.3(d)(1)-(2).
78 See Keller supra note 57 at Section II. A.1.
79 A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2005).
80 Id. R. 1.6 (b)(2).
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“[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct
with the client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
81
law.”
However, a lawyer does not become party to a criminal or fraudulent
course of action solely based on the fact that a client may use his advice to
further her criminal purposes. The MRPC recognizes the critical difference
between providing legal analysis of a proposed conduct and providing the
82
means by which it can be committed with impunity.
On the other hand, the rules provide more definitive guidance for the
lawyer when he discovers the client is engaged in ongoing fraudulent or
criminal activity. The lawyer “shall withdraw” if “representation will result
83
in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law.” However,
the lawyer “may withdraw” for good cause, some examples of which include situations where the client persists in a course of conduct “involving
the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or
84
fraudulent;” or where “the client has used the lawyer’s services that the
85
lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent.” Notably, the lawyer’s mandatory withdrawal duty is only triggered in extreme cases, for
example, if the client demands that the attorney engage in illegal or unethi86
cal conduct, a situation that, although possible, is likely to rarely present
itself so blatantly. The permissiveness standard of MRPC R. 1.16(b) provides that the option to withdraw is only available if it can be accomplished
87
without “material adverse effect” to the client.
Also applicable is MRPC R. 1.13 which, in the context of the organizational client relationship, establishes that, if the lawyer knows that an
officer or employee is engaged in illegal action, he shall proceed in the best
88
interest of the organization. The rule was modified after SOX to harmonize with federal requirements, or to restate the federal requirement in terms
conforming to the general regulatory framework of the MRPC. Here, the
obligation of up-the-ladder reporting, although established in positive seemingly mandatory terms, leaves it up to the lawyer to determine whether it
is necessary to do so, and whether it is in the best interest of the organiza81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. R. 1.2 (d).
Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 9.
Id. R. 1.16 (a)(1).
Id. R. 1.16 (b)(2).
A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (b)(3).
Id. R. 1.16 cmt. 2.
Id. R. 1.16 cmt. 7.
Id. R. 1.13 (b) (the lawyer “shall report” unless he reasonably believes it not necessary).
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89

tion. Likewise, the choice of whether the lawyer should report out information relating to the representation, when the highest authority in the organization insists upon a course of action that is clearly in violation of the
law and reasonably certain to cause substantial injury to the organization, is
90
left with the attorney if and to the extent that he believes it necessary.
The ABA rules in this area have been criticized as lacking substance
91
and not being adequately enforced. Conversely, after the 2003 revisions,
they have also been criticized for eroding the foundation of attorney-client
confidentiality by expanding the exceptions to its protective advocacy cocoon, and by forcing the lawyer to take into account with heightened
awareness the financial interests of third parties in deciding whether to re92
port client confidences.
The MRPC is adopted by each state only to the extent that the rules are
found persuasive. Even after SOX and the 2003 MRPC revisions, to date
there is substantial diversity among the rules adopted by the states on the
importance of confidentiality, reflecting different judgments as to the proper
balance to be maintained between the trust-inducing confidentiality rules,
and the obligations of lawyers to third parties reflected in an almost even
split between jurisdictions that mandate or permit disclosure, and jurisdic93
tions that prohibit it.
6. Uneasy Coexistence of Federal and State Professional Conduct
Rules
When SOX was enacted, the domestic bar was outraged by the federal
94
intervention in a traditionally state regulated subject matter. There was
concern about the creation of additional conflicting standards governing
lawyers inherent in the intervention of a different regulatory body. There
was the sentiment that, with respect to regulating lawyers, SOX opened a
Pandora’s box. There was preoccupation with overlapping norms emanating
from federal and state levels. There were misgivings over inviting trespass95
ers into the traditional domain of the ABA. Indeed, Section 307 and related SEC rules delineate norms of conduct piece-meal, with little regard to
how the rules integrate with a body of law, that has been evolving and refining for decades, tending towards a basis of national uniformity, while allowing the states to experiment and express their judgment regarding how
89

See id. R. 1.13 (b).
Id. R. 1.13 (c) (1)-(2).
91 Greene, supra note 54, at 820-22.
92 Bost, supra note 38, at 1140-42.
93 Id. at 1125-26.
94 See Henning, supra note 5, at 345.
95 Chi Soo Kim & Elisabeth Lafitte, The Potential Effects of SEC Regulation of Attorney Conduct
Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 707, 708-09 (2003).
90
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the local bar should conduct itself vis-à-vis their clients, and in general, as
professionals in the law.
However, with the SEC final rules, some of the outrage subsided because the rules—at least on their face, pending authoritative interpretation
by the Division of Enforcement—have mediated some of the most troublesome issues raised by the federal intervention. First, by defining a new
category, the “attorney appearing and practicing” before the SEC, the rules
have arguably limited their reach to those members of the bar who satisfy
those requirements, and subjected only that subset of attorneys to their pur96
view. Some commentators have gone so far as characterizing the rules,
after the “fall” of the “noisy withdrawal” or “dirty withdrawal” as “substan97
tially inoffensive.” Second, the lamented inconsistencies between state
rules and federal rules, although most certainly not eliminated, especially in
98
light of the inter-jurisdictional variations mentioned above, have been
lessened by conflict resolution provisions that, at least with regards to discipline and sanctions or other liability under state rules of professional conduct, exempt the “appearing and practicing” lawyer from the impossible
99
task of following conflicting mandates between the SEC and his state bar.
Third, the same conflict as it pertains to foreign attorneys has been resolved
in the opposite manner, i.e. by exempting foreign attorneys from following
100
SEC rules when prohibited by applicable foreign law.
However, on the negative side, unlike state bar rules of professional
responsibility, mainly because the SEC rules are federal and their enforcement is not likely to mirror their state counterparts, some commentators
have predicted that they are likely to have their principal effect, not by influencing the behavior of lawyers, but by creating the principles under
which the appearing and practicing lawyers will be subjected to SEC sanc101
tions. In other words, the main thrust of the federal rules would be negative rather than positive and constructive, and premised, not on the facts as
102
understood or anticipated by the lawyer, but as they later unravel, inevitably giving in to hindsight bias. In addition, according to some, the SEC

96

17 C.F.R. § 205.1 and 205.2 (2003).
Lorne, supra note 11. However, the fall of the noisy withdrawal rule could be a premature
conclusion, since reportedly the SEC is taking a wait and see approach on its introduction. Id.; see Sue
Reisinger, Securities Law: At the Revolution, CORPORATE COUNSEL Vol. 6 Issue 03 (March 2006) available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1140689110891 (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
98 See supra Section II.A.5.
99 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(c) (2003) (compliance in good faith to the SEC rules shall not subject the
attorney to discipline under inconsistent rules of the state bar where he is admitted to practice).
100 Id. § 205.6(d).
101 Lorne, supra note 11.
102 Id.
97

2008]

Reporting Rules for U.S. and International Lawyers

477

rules in their definitional precision would exceed the scope permitted by
103
SOX.
Furthermore, areas of direct conflict between MRPC and SEC rules
still persist, and not on minor points. For example, while MRPC R. 1.6
states that the attorney shall not reveal any information pertaining to client
representation without prior client permission, derogating only in the case
104
of the crime fraud exception, the SOX up-the-ladder reporting rules require just the opposite, establishing that up-the-ladder reporting does not
105
constitute violation of clients’ confidences. Of course, the SEC rules give
a way out to the “appearing and practicing” attorneys and support compliance with SOX by establishing that compliance can be used as a defense
in case the attorney is reported to the disciplinary board of the state where
106
he practices. The reporting attorney, therefore, most likely violates the
rules of ethics he vowed to uphold as the price to pay for not violating the
107
SEC rules where the penalties are extremely severe.
Indeed, the non-complying “appearing and practicing” attorney is subject to civil penalties as well as SEC remedies available under securities
laws, including civil injunction, monetary penalties, and cease and desist
108
orders. Attorneys are also subject to discipline and potential suspension
under the SEC rules of practice, but not to criminal liability for the violation
109
The professional responsibility rules subject the
of the duty to report.
individual attorney to liability, but should not subject his firm to liability;
however, the SEC could sanction the law firm or the company that employs
110
the lawyer on other bases. In fact, a willful violation of SOX, or any rules
enacted under it, is punishable with maximum prison sentences of twenty
years and maximum fines of $5 million for a natural person, and up to $25
111
million for a business.
B. Is Mandatory Up-the-Ladder Reporting the Solution?
Many experts, after a critical analysis of the Enron debacle, believe
that it would be fallacious to expect that that a set of rules would be sufficient to correct the underlying causes of financial disasters resting on an
103

Id. at 399.
Thompson, supra note 10, at 268; MRPC R. 1.6 limits the disclosure “to the extent that the
lawyer reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent a client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.” A.B.A MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2005).
105 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2003).
106 Thompson, supra note 10; 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(c) (2003).
107 Thompson, supra note 10, at 268-69.
108 Keller, supra note 57, at 11.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Thompson, supra note 10; 15 U.S.C. § 78j-o, 7210 (2002).
104
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entrenched culture of cavalier practices and corporate incentives that en112
courage or permit deception and fraud. Commentators have posited that
it is likely the new rules will not have a meaningful impact on the behavior
113
For example, Jeffrey Garten, Dean of the Yale
of corporate lawyers.
School of Management, has warned against the creation of an audit mentality based on the illusion that enough rules, and literal compliance with them,
114
will make up for structural deficiencies in corporate governance. Many
have suggested that, instead of federal rules, a starting point to reassess the
role of the lawyer in corporate governance should be to do away with conditions endemic to the corporate world, such as personal competitiveness or
the premium placed on expediency and flexibility that, although not unethical per se, may compromise the basis for independent professional judg115
ment of counsel. But the interventions needed to bring about these types
of shifts may be daunting, expensive, operate on the long term, and are not
as immediately visible as a set of federal rules.
Noting that lawyers normally try to stay away from fraud, alternative
explanations of the corporate debacles have been proposed that take the
focus away from the lawyer’s professional practice, allegedly at the service
of schemes to defraud investors, positing that some members of the bar may
be as susceptible as sophisticated investors, analysts, and other employees
116
to be fooled by skilled perpetrators. “Perpetrators of large scale fraud
117
succeed because they are good at it.” Inevitably, when the fraud is uncovered, investigation will reveal signals that, in hindsight, may appear so
118
clear that they should have been identified earlier on, especially, so the
reasoning goes, by the lawyer who is charged with knowledge of the difference between legal and illegal conduct.
Others have welcomed the coherent set of coordinated reforms heralded by SOX and followed by Sentencing Guidelines and by amendments
to the MRPC. All share a similar approach, that of relying on lawyers as the
eyes and ears of government to monitor corporate malfeasance and to create
112 Contra, William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for
Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 35 (2005) (concluding that the rules “undercut the attractiveness of deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity” and continue the trend of increasing legal
pressures towards “duties of inquiry and articulation” exemplified by the federal courts imposition of
criminal liability in situations of “conscious avoidance”).
113 Lorne, supra note 11, at 400.
114 Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, in ENRON CORPORATE
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, 625, 641 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
115 Id.; see, e.g., Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, 49 VILL. L. REV. 867, 867-68
(2004) (positing that “the problem of lawyer complicity, active or passive, in managerial wrongdoing
may be rooted in a socially determined moral obtuseness shared by too many corporate managers and
corporate lawyers” so deeply embedded in the social context that rules may affect it only marginally).
116 Lorne, supra note 11, at 401.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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a more transparent, ethical corporate environment to restore the confidence
119
of the investing marketplace. Some consider promising the fact that the
reforms enlist the insiders of the organization, who are the repositories of
information, and use stiff penalties to help them overcome the gut wrenching moral and social challenges involved in turning in friends. At the same
time, these reforms elevate corporate wrongdoing to the top of prosecutorial
agendas, sensitizing the public and potentially, in the long run, bringing
120
about a change in norms of behavior in the business world.
Other commentators have characterized the provisions addressed spe121
cifically to the lawyers as largely aspirational. Even though the quest to
enlist the support of corporate attorneys to help the cause of preventing
corporate crime may have been admirable in its purpose, it was viewed as
ill-conceived in its means, and generated a vituperative response from the
122
bar, as opposed to the hoped for compliance and the ultimate change in
behavior of lawyers and clients. These critics maintain it was a mistake to
introduce the idea of the lawyer as gatekeeper and attempt to impose a
harsh rule that compounded “noise” with “withdrawal” impinging so deeply
on confidentiality, the basic tenet of client representation, to then fall short
of even imposing withdrawal in case of failure of the client corporation to
123
take appropriate action. Mandatory withdrawal, it is argued, could have
been a potent tool in preventing misconduct, and in sending a signal to the
124
corporation and other lawyers that the entity stands on shaky ground. In
fact, every time a corporation would have to secure a new attorney after the
withdrawal of the predecessor, the causes of such a drastic act would be
disclosed and investigated, potentially providing new counsel leverage for
125
the client to accede to his compliance demands. While lawyers may have
played a part in corporate scandals, it is not certain whether many of them
126
were at the center of the problem or could have averted it. In either case,
according to these voices, a better conceived rule would be one that simply
withholds the tools for the commission of wrongdoing when all else fails,
127
while falling short of reporting out.
119 See Pamela H. Bucy, Symposium, White Collar Criminal Law in Comparative Perspective:
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: “Carrots and Sticks”: Post Enron Regulatory Initiatives, 8 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 277, 306 (2004).
120 Id. at 314-15.
121 Henning, supra note 5, at 324.
122 Id. at 325.
123 Id. at 325-26.
124 Id. at 326.
125 Id. at 326-27.
126 Henning, supra note 5, at 328. However, examples where the attorney was the linchpin of
scandals include Parmalat S.p.A., where Gian Paolo Zini, the company’s long-term outside counsel, was
one of the architects of the fictitious transactions that led to its precipitous bankruptcy and to ruinous
losses to its investors. Id.
127 Id. at 328-29.
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Other commentators have emphasized that when it comes to gatekeeping rules, allowing jurisdictional experimentation may be a better solution than imposing the same standard across multiple jurisdictions either
condoning or outright condemning experimentation and its learning oppor128
tunities. The tradeoff is between promoting unimpeded flow of information to the gatekeepers through confidentiality rules which may discourage
adequate response to risk, and promoting adequate response to risk through
mandatory reporting up, withdrawal, or reporting out, which may cut off the
129
flow of information necessary for risk evaluation. Better solutions would
probably emerge from experimentation in each jurisdiction, which allows
for faster and more focused reaction to outcomes as well as jurisdictional
130
competition, regarded as a central component of institutional design.
Considering the initial thrust of the proposed rules (including “noisy withdrawal” and a broad jurisdictional reach) and the subsequent retreat, it is
unlikely that the SEC would aggressively pursue observance by foreign
131
attorneys.
Still other voices noted that the SEC has been relatively lenient with
lawyers as compared to accountants and executives, and attributed the
marked difference in treatment to the recognition that lawyers must still
132
fulfill their obligation of zealous advocacy in favor of their client. Lawyers, therefore maintain a position quite apart from accountants whose role
133
entails third party scrutiny of their client financial records. Also, the difference in treatment can be attributed to the fact that, traditionally, attorneys
have long-established, strong self-governing bodies committed to creating,
refining, and enforcing ethical standards with what many regard as a good
134
measure of success. This commitment is evidenced by the enactment of
professional standards since the 19th Century, followed by the ABA Canons
of Professional Ethics, and eventually by the MRPC, which provides the
basis of each state disciplinary code and rules of professional responsibili135
Further, State Bar Associations issue ethical opinions regarding the
ty.
interpretation of the rules and according to which attorneys are expected to
128 Richard W. Painter, Evaluation and Response to Risk by Lawyers and Accountants in the U.S.
and E.U.: Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L.
399, 400 (2003).
129 Id. at 415, 420.
130 Id. at 421, 422 (pointing out that the New Institutional Economics perspective looks less at the
effectiveness of rules in isolation and more at the effectiveness of institutions, a combination of formal
and informal rules and sanctions; less to the static, equilibrium viewpoint, and more to the evolutionary
processes bringing about institutional arrangements that emerge to solve problems).
131 Id. at 421.
132 Robert J. Anello, Sarbanes-Oxley Wake Up Call to Attorneys, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 545,
547 (2004).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 557.
135 Id. at 557-58.
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model their professional behavior; and, lastly, states have grievance systems
136
run through the state courts.
1. Unintended Consequences
Many commentators have concluded that mandatory reporting rules
disturb the traditional nature of the attorney-client relationship in the corporate environment and, instead of furthering the purposes of SOX by improving corporate governance, reducing misconduct, giving clarity and guidance
to securities lawyers in reference to their ethical obligations, and ultimately
protecting the investing public, can instead promote results that run counter
137
to SOX’s objectives. For example, one criticism is that the rules take a
static view of the attorney-client relationship and do not consider the effect
that a change in the power of one party to the relationship produces on the
other party, suggesting that corporate dynamics will neutralize the intended
138
function of the lawyer as gatekeeper. This perspective focuses on the likely adaptive behaviors produced by reporting, such as selective information
sharing with internal counsel, cabining information different lawyers receive, using of outside counsel to control the flow of information more easily and because outside counsel can be easily dismissed, and non-lawyers as
139
much as possible. With available firms, large and small, as outside counsel competing for business and negotiating at different levels with the company and internal counsel, corporations are likely to negotiate the right mix
140
of lawyers’ services to minimize their combined influence via reporting.
The reporting rules, in this view, end up producing perverse effects, indeed
reducing the opportunities for lawyers to prevent potentially unlawful conduct by their remonstration and persuasion or to identify unlawful conduct
141
and exert their influence to eliminate it.
Also, corporate counsel, eager to avoid liability, will tend to err on the
side of caution, and potentially waste a lot of time and resources within the
142
organization by over-reporting. The same fear may tend to produce the

136

Id. at 558-59
Lauren Harper, Comment, United States Regulation of Canadian Securities Attorneys under
Sarbanes- Oxley: Exploring Costs and Finding an Optimal Allocation of Authority, 36 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 139, 140-141 (2004); see also Lorne, supra note 11, at 404 (noting that the rules are likely
to exacerbate current trends in corporate practice promoting internalization, the tendency of in house
counsel to keep more of the legal work for himself to control the reporting, while outside firms, which
may not be anxious to file reports either may also encourage internalization of legal work; corporate
counsel may also want to reduce the number of matters in the hand of the SEC counsel- the one “appearing and practicing” and therefore subject to the SEC rules- encouraging balkanization).
138 Zacharias, supra note 15.
139 Id. at 481-82.
140 Id. at 488.
141 See Anello, supra note 132, at 559.
142 Greene, supra note 54, at 848-849.
137
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additional counterproductive, adaptive behavior of information avoidance
on the part of the lawyer: since the rules do not include a “should have
known” standard, one way of avoiding the trigger of reporting duties with
its unsavory repercussions and potential liability for counsel is to actually
143
“know” less. Sadly, the less informed corporate attorney is also less effec144
Also, the less intive at delivering professional services to the client.
formed, less effective attorney costs additional money to the organization
that depends on the lawyer for advice. Arguably, for the lawyer to be able
to identify potential pitfalls, and to educate the client as to the appropriate
course of action under current law, whose meaning is less than clear cut,
this likely result is the exact opposite of what the federalization of professional responsibility rules was intended to achieve.
2. Lawyers’ Role Redefined?
Most dramatically, the rules intending lawyers as gatekeepers of good
corporate governance challenge the traditional role of the lawyer in an adversarial system. The attorney in an adversarial system is viewed by many
145
as the most unlikely candidate for a watchdog position. Placing the attorney in that role is antithetic, not only to the information exchange in an
146
atmosphere of trust that is central to effective client representation, but to
the lawyer’s ability to assume and maintain a partisan posture, central to
preserving the integrity of the system and to the corollary of the lawyer’s
duty of zealous advocacy on behalf of the client vis-à-vis the counterpart
147
and, even more importantly, vis-à-vis the government.
In this light, the federal rules of professional conduct challenge the
foundations of the adversarial system, threaten the independence of the bar,
and redefine the meaning of lawyering, at least in this area of legal practice.
Indeed, many attorneys rely on their duty of confidentiality to lay the foundation for a relationship of trust, encouraging the client to reveal as much
detail as possible to facilitate rendering the best legal advice and to minim148
ize surprises later on. Mandatory reporting makes lawyers accountable to
third parties while at the service of the client, placing the lawyer in the unenviable position of serving two masters, and reducing the client’s (or its
agents’) expectation of confidentiality which hinders trust, central to a suc-

143

Id. at 849.
Id.
145 See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 15, at 501-02.
146 Id. at 494.
147 See A.B.A MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2005) (explaining the duty of the
advocate to use legal procedure to the fullest advantage of his client in light of the fact that the law,
while establishing limits of conduct, is ambiguous and dynamic).
148 Bost, supra note 38, at 1140.
144
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149

cessful attorney-client relationship. Although up-the-ladder reporting has
the ostensible purpose of serving the client, by allowing information of potential wrongdoing to reach the head of the legal department or the BOD for
correction, the process is likely to produce the undesired effect of depriving
150
lawyers of the information they need to properly advise their client. This
likely will not succeed in changing the perspective and behavior of the corporate lawyer to focus on preventing, discouraging, or intercepting and correcting corporate misconduct at the outset, presumably the ultimate purpose
of the rules.
For example, Professor Baimbridge notes that SEC rules do little to
151
combat the natural tendency of lawyers not to antagonize their employers.
In his opinion, corporate attorneys inescapably fall into the cognitive bias of
skewing their analysis of their clients’ conduct in positive terms, and “turn a
152
blind eye” to their client’s misconduct. Also, even assuming that corporate attorneys were not victims of this occupational hazard, arguably, as we
have seen, without mandatory withdrawal or “noisy withdrawal,” the SEC
rules have no bite to the extent that they fail to provide leverage to the cor153
porate attorney in influencing client’s behavior. In this light, the structural attack to the bar’s professional independence and time honored, if not
perfect, self-regulation is therefore even less justified.
However, the most poignant and harshest challenge to the federal professional responsibility rules, determinative in their final assessment of propriety domestically and internationally, is the one that turns on the very
structure and philosophy underlying our legal system. This challenge retains its legitimacy even though refinement of the implementation rules and
prosecutorial discretion by the SEC, as it relates to the “appearing and practicing” bar, may moderate the sweeping effect of the federal professional
responsibility rules compared to what was originally anticipated. It is indeed very poor policy to have a prosecutor, and the SEC is primarily a
154
prosecutor, in charge of regulating the bar that practices before it. It is like
having the U.S. Attorney’s Office regulating the behavior and professional
155
ethics of the criminal defense bar. Indeed, the most troublesome aspect is
that the up-the-ladder reporting provisions apply not only to situations related to the preparation of disclosure documents, which would be less pro149

Id. at 1141-44.
M. Peter Moser & Stanley Keller, Sarbanes-Oxley 307: Trusted Counselors or Informers? 49
VILL. L. REV. 833, 837 (2004).
151 Noorishad, supra note 21, at 1051.
152 Id.
153 See supra Section II.B.
154 Richard W. Painter, Roberta S. Karmel & Stewart Kaswell, Symposium, The Evolving Legal
and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Panel 2 The Evolution of Corporate Governance, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 613, 620 (2003) (hereinafter Evolving).
155 Id.
150
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foundly troublesome and logically justifiable as part of the overall federal
intervention on corporate governance, but also to attorneys who are instead
156
working on enforcement actions on behalf of their clients. Even though
the SEC may state that it does not intend to impede zealous advocacy, the
rules turn attorneys into policemen working in part for their clients and in
157
part for the SEC.
Yet another challenge is that the reporting rules go beyond mere violations of securities laws to encompass breaches of fiduciary duty under state
158
law and other violations in general, effectively, at least facially, giving
this newly instituted police core “general jurisdiction.” The imprecise, potentially sweeping phraseology of Section 307 extends reporting to a poten159
tially undetermined array of possible violations.
The last, but not least bit of irony, is that not only has the economic
burden of this investigative, fact-gathering, and prosecutorial function been
placed on the very people and organizations the SEC is after, but also the
budget for that function has been increased. In this light, SOX professional
responsibility rules are a swift move, especially considering that the provi160
sion regarding attorneys was tacked on without much debate, to reconfigure corporate internal and external counsel as the privately funded security
force of the modern corporate governance scheme, a wholly unacceptable
federal deputization.
Of course, one of the propelling forces behind the regulations affecting
lawyers, besides the fact that attorneys do not enjoy widespread esteem as a
category, is that they were to blame for the recent corporate failures. The
provisions regulating the bar were intended to punish lawyers for their role
during the securities bubble, when, as a group, they were perceived as making inordinate profits, while turning a blind eye to potential fraudulent
161
162
schemes. However, if the purpose was to punish lawyers as a category,
the profession comes out winning financially and occupationally, at least to
the extent that the solution incorporated in SOX translates into the need for
163
yet more lawyers to wade through a regulatory and business environment
156

Id. at 624.
Id.
158 Id. at 621.
159 Commentators have defined this imprecision as one of the many “vagaries” of SOX. See, e.g.,
ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW, 488 (LexisNexis 2d
ed. 2004).
160 Evolving, supra note 154, at 621.
161 Id. at 624.
162 Contra Koniak, supra note 23 (casting a dark light on the entire legal profession; implying that
for every one of the lawyers that may have been found at the center of a fraudulent activities perpetrated
by their client, there are scores who are never examined; noting that even the lawyers investigated were
dealt a light hand by the investigators; and maintaining that lawyers had to be at the very center of the
corporate scandals storm).
163 Evolving, supra note 154, at 624.
157
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of ever increasing complexity, even though confidentiality, loyalty, and
zealous advocacy, time honored earmarks of the profession, may have been
dealt a deadly blow.
III. EXPORTING THE SOLUTION
To get or to maintain access to the U.S. market, now foreign companies must do much more than simply “divulge the cold numbers behind
164
their operations.” The environment in which the SEC operates has dramatically changed, and foreign issuers have increased exponentially, comprising approximately one-third of the capitalization of the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) in 2002 with $4.3 trillion and 17% of the listings from a
165
humble beginning of 33 in 1975. The increase of foreign issuers in U.S.
166
markets has been matched by a decrease of U.S. listings in recent years.
These days, given the preeminence of foreign issuers in U.S. markets and
the interdependence of capital markets the world over, the SEC cannot
promulgate securities regulations without taking into account their impact
167
on foreign companies. In the past, the SEC granted accommodations and
exemptions to foreign issuers, to account for differences in corporate go168
vernance environments foreign issuers function within. Because of the
political pressures at the time of enactment, SOX largely ignored these differences; at least on its face, SOX seems to reach beyond U.S. borders into
areas that would generally be the subject of domestic regulation in other
169
countries.
In general, foreign issuers have to adapt their corporate structure and
their business practices to the U.S. business model, and particularly to the
170
This
“model of corporate governance crafted by the U.S. Congress.”
presents several problems: (1) it offends traditional rules of comity, which
respecting other nations’ sovereignty, would favor a deferential approach to
the laws of other states; (2) it potentially clashes with corporate governance
models that reflect different value systems and different social systems; and
(3) it presents unique interpretation challenges because foreign attorneys
are ill prepared to maneuver through a maze of American-grown legal concepts in figuring out whether they fall within or beyond the purview of the
rules.

164
165
166
167
168
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Cramton, supra note 3, at 525.
Greene, supra note 54, at 824.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 824.
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Id. at 826.
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A. Extraterritoriality of SOX
SOX has been considered another aspect of American economic impe171
SOX imposes standards on foreign issuers who are already obrialism.
172
liged to follow their own country’s corporate governance rules. The extension of the SEC jurisdiction across international borders is considered
completely inappropriate, particularly as it pertains to Section 307, because
it infringes on a purely domestic matter, the rules of professional conduct of
the legal profession in the respective countries, based on the fact that, occasionally, the attorney may represent a corporate client which, by virtue of
173
being listed with the SEC, is subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.
Indeed, at the enactment of Section 307 with its original corollaries of
possible mandates of “noisy withdrawal” and before the adoption of the
final rules by the SEC, which toned down and made some accommodations
for international legal practitioners caught in the web of multiple uncertain
and conflicting professional obligations, the international legal community
174
was outraged. The International Bar Association requested complete exemption for attorneys not admitted to practice in the Unites States from the
175
up-the-ladder reporting requirements. The refinements of the final rules,
requiring the attorney “appearing and practicing” to satisfy specific crite176
ria, and excluding foreign attorneys from some of the obligations imposed on domestic counsel, have the effect of exempting many, although
not all, foreign lawyers from the purview of the Rules.
1. General Principles
a) Bases for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. At the outset, the general
principle of international law is that a nation’s assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction, the reach of its laws, does not extend beyond its national territo177
ry. Similarly, under traditional canons of statutory construction, there is a
178
presumption against extraterritoriality. Therefore, the legislation of Con-

171 Corinne A. Falencki, Comment, Sarbanes-Oxley: Ignoring the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1211, 1224 (2004).
172 Greene, supra note 54, at 825.
173 Harper, supra note 137, at 141.
174 Exch. Act Release 47241 (Jan. 24, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/338180.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
175 Id.
176 See infra Section III.B.1
177 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (holding that acts of a
domestic corporation outside the U.S. in a conspiracy to drive a competitor out of business cannot be the
basis for a action in treble damages in the U.S., as the Court refused to sit in judgment on the legality of
a Costa Rican seizure in application of the principle whereby courts of one country will not sit in judgment of the acts of the government of another done within its territory).
178 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
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gress, unless a contrary intent is shown, does not apply outside of the
179
U.S. This, in turn, is founded on the basic principle of unnecessary conflict avoidance with foreign sovereigns, which is at the basis of Congressional legislation and finds its origin and counterpart in customary interna180
tional law. But the question of whether a U.S. law applies to citizens of
other countries is a question of construction, rather than of sovereign power,
181
generally resolved by the courts. A brief overview of several traditional
approaches developed by U.S. courts to decide whether asserting jurisdiction was proper in specific cases, mostly in the context of antitrust and securities, and the position of the Restatement of Foreign Relations and prevalent doctrine follows.
(i) The Territorial Approach. Almost a century ago, in 1909, Justice Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., held that when a
statute is silent it should be construed to apply only within the territory of
182
the United States.
Justice Holmes referred to the almost universal principle whereby the character of an act, lawful or unlawful, should be determined with reference to the territory over which the legitimate power of the
183
legislator extends.
(ii) The Effects Test. The Second Circuit first announced the “effects
test” in 1968 in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, where the court held that it had
subject matter jurisdiction where fraudulent extraterritorial conduct had a
substantial impact on the investors’ market in the U.S. This case dealt with
a shareholder of a Canadian corporation trading in the Toronto and the U.S.
184
stock exchanges that alleged fraud against the shareholders and directors.
The test, with its vague contours, seems to cast a wide net; however, courts
185
have applied it sparingly.
(iii) The Conduct Test. Under this test, if significant conduct involving a security fraud violation occurred in the U.S., the jurisdiction of the
186
federal court is established regardless of the nationality of the victim.

179
180

Id.
Falencki, supra note 171, at 1219; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 40

(1965).
181 Blackmer v. U.S., 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (holding that a statute providing for service by consul
on witnesses abroad who are U.S. citizens and for ensuing contempt proceedings whereby property of
the witness may be seized following notice, service and failure to appear does not deny due process and
is therefore valid).
182 American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357.
183 Id. at 356.
184 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 204-08 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (holding § 10(b)
applicable even when the fraudulent acts were committed outside of the U.S. and the securities belonged
to a foreign company doing business in the U.S. where the transaction involves listed securities and are
detrimental to the interests of American investors).
185 Jonathan Shirley, Note, International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 519 (2004).
186 Id. at 520.
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Different circuits approach the application of this test more or less rigidly.
For example, the Second Circuit uses the test most rigidly, while the Third,
Eighth and Ninth Circuits take a less rigid view whereby any significant
activity taking place in the U.S. in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme can
187
provide the basis for jurisdiction.
(iv) The Balancing Approach. By the time Judge Choy wrote his
opinion in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America in 1976, American
Banana had been limited to its facts and there was no doubt that at least
American antitrust laws would apply to conduct taking place in other na188
tions. It was clearly understood that extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction was a concern for foreign nations, and they might resent “broad asser189
tions of authority by American courts.” Judge Choy opted for the applica190
tion of a “jurisdictional rule of reason,” weighing a number of factors to
decide whether the “links to the United States . . . are sufficiently strong,
vis-à-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial
191
authority.” He considered conflicts with foreign law or policy; nationality; allegiance of parties; and locations or principal places of business, and
the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance. He further considered the relative significance of effects on the
U.S. as opposed to elsewhere, the existence of an explicit purpose to harm
American commerce, the forseeability of such an effect, and the relative
importance to the violations charged that they be conducted within the
192
United States as opposed to abroad. In determining whether U.S. contacts
and interests are sufficient to support extraterritorial jurisdiction, in respect
of comity and fairness principles, the court is not required to evaluate foreign law or policy, but the legitimacy of the interests of each nation, and the
court needs to evaluate only the concern of each state with the suit at
193
hand.
(v) The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations. Even though
not binding on courts, it includes the broadest statement of extraterritorial
reach of U.S. securities regulations, stating that courts have jurisdiction
over conduct predominantly occurring in the U.S. related to a securities
transaction, even if the transaction itself takes place outside of the U.S.,
including investment advice or solicitation of proxies or of consents with
194
respect to securities. The U.S. exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe de187

Id.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1976).
189 Id. at 609.
190 Id. at 613.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 614.
193 Id. at 614-15.
194 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 416 (1987) (Jurisdiction to Regulate Activities Related to Securities).
188
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pends on (a) whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in light of the
conduct’s expected substantial effect on the U.S. securities markets; (b)
whether representations or negotiations are conducted in the U.S.; (c)
whether the party to be subjected to jurisdiction is an American or a foreigner; or (d) whether the party to be protected is a U.S. national or resi195
dent.
(vi) Evidence of direct conflict with laws regulating the same issue.
This test, adopted by some scholars, and also reflected in the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 40, looks at the interests of the competing countries in regulating the conduct, and if there is a conflict, then
196
principles of comity apply. Each state in a situation of conflict is required
by international law to moderate the exercise of its enforcement jurisdic197
tion.
b) Extraterritoriality of Securities Law: Regulation S. SOX is directed
at issuers. Any foreign company that wants to list its securities in the
NYSE, American Stock Exchange or Nasdaq must register with the SEC
and, therefore, comes under the purview of SOX. However, SOX does not
add to the extraterritorial applicability of U.S. securities laws; consequently,
its extraterritorial reach is determined by reference to other securities
198
laws. In the ambit of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws, a
duality exists. On one side, Regulation S, adopted by the SEC in 1990, specifies when securities transactions fall outside of the reach of U.S. securities
laws, codifying the territorial reach of Section 5 of the Securities Act of
199
1933, which was previously left to the interpretation of the courts. It sets
forth two conditions for issuing and reselling unregistered securities:
1. The offer or sale must be made in an “offshore transaction”; and
2. No “directed selling efforts” can be made in the United States.

200

An offshore transaction occurs when the offer was not made to someone in
the United States and either the buyer is outside of the U.S., or the transac201
tion is executed on a foreign exchange. “Directed selling” means any
activity in preparation for the sale of those securities, such as road shows or
202
advertising efforts taking place in the United States. Regulation S clari195

Id.
Falencki, supra note 171, at 1222; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 40
(1965) (stating that “where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law” requiring
inconsistent conduct by the person, “each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith,
moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction”).
197 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 40 (1965).
198 Shirley, supra note 185, at 501.
199 Id. at 517.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
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fied the reach of U.S. securities registration requirements, preventing application of those requirements from interfering with the sovereignty of other
203
countries.
c) Enforcement of the Anti-Fraud Provisions. On the other hand, since
the anti-fraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws are seen as a cornerstone in promoting stability of the U.S. capital markets, and in protecting
204
investors, their territorial application is considered broader. For example,
when Rule 10b-5 was promulgated, since the bulk of securities transactions
were predominantly in the domestic market, there was scant attention to the
rule’s far-reaching language, while the U.S. Congress and the SEC remained silent on its territorial reach. Therefore, the courts were left to de205
fine this area, and, as noted above, they continue to be divided on the
206
factors establishing jurisdiction. Consequently, investors and issuers in
international transactions face uncertainties regarding the applicability of
207
the antifraud provisions.
d) Extraterritoriality of U.S. Ethics Rules for Lawyers. Recognizing
208
the increasing prevalence of cross-border practice, the MRPC has also
undertaken to state its extraterritorial reach in the 2003 revisions, specifying
how lawyers’ ethics rules are to be understood and applied to U.S. lawyers
practicing abroad. MRPC R. 8.5 states that a lawyer admitted to practice in
one jurisdiction is subject to the rules of that jurisdiction as well as of those
209
where the conduct occurred, and can be subject to discipline in both.
Choice of law is determined in favor of the jurisdiction where the tribunal
210
sits “for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal,”
and for any other conduct, either where it occurred, or where the predomi211
nant effect of the conduct occurred. On the other hand, the lawyer will not
be subject to discipline if his conduct conforms to the ethics rules of the
jurisdiction where he reasonably believed the predominant effect would
212
occur. These provisions apply to lawyers in transnational practice “unless
international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulato213
ry authorities . . . provide otherwise.”

203

Id. at 518.
Shirley, supra note 185, at 518.
205 See supra Section III.A.1.a.
206 Shirley, supra note 185, at 518-19.
207 Id. at 522-23.
208 Natalie E. Norfus, Note, Assessing the Recent Revisions to Model Rule 8.5: How do the
Changes Affect U.S. Attorneys Practicing Abroad, Specifically those Practicing in Japan?, 36 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 623, 628, 633 (2004).
209 A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (2005).
210 Id. R. 8.5(b)(1).
211 Id. R. 8.5(b)(2).
212 Id.
213 Id. R. 8.5 cmt. 7.
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By giving priority to the rules of the tribunal where the matter is pending, MRPC R. 8.5 encourages respect of the rules of conduct of the foreign
214
country of transnational practice. The disposition is worded with a view
to international application and has a broad reach, as demonstrated by the
use of the word “tribunal,” which encompasses a wider range of judicial
215
bodies, as opposed to the narrower term “court”. Although the lawyer is
given some leeway with respect to which discipline norm to follow, it is a
choice based on reasonable belief, not a choice to ignore U.S. rules in case
216
of doubt.
2. How Much Extraterritoriality?
Although the legislative history of SOX shows no specific intent re217
garding its applicability abroad, by its plain language, it is directed at
issuers and their employees and consultants wherever located. Applicability of SOX is subordinate to being an issuer, and therefore, it is conditioned
218
on the issuer being subject to registration. In this context, the extraterritoriality of SOX is limited under Regulation S, and therefore, there is no risk
that SOX will ensnare a foreign transaction that would not have fallen un219
der U.S. jurisdiction prior to the passage of SOX. Based on these observations, it would seem that SOX would raise little concern abroad; howev220
er, the opposite has been true.
Indeed SOX has restricted access to the U.S. capital markets by foreign issuers because, in addition to complying with registration provisions
and providing disclosure of numbers behind their operations, now the foreign issuer is forced to conform to the model of corporate governance envi221
sioned by the U.S. Congress. SOX has been another example, probably
the most relevant to date, where the U.S. is asserting its role of international
corporate regulator, based on its own perception of the needs brought about
by the globalization of markets, with little respect for either sovereignty of
other nations or principles of comity. Thus, the U.S. is promulgating rules
that appear in conflict with principles of public international law regarding
222
the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. In addition, there is an anticompetitive aspect to SOX in that compliance costs are much higher for foreign
as opposed to domestic issuers. Foreign issuers face a higher risk of error
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and, consequently, of criminal liability, and exemptions favor U.S. issu223
ers. Of course the defense to these contentions is that foreign companies
chose to subject themselves to the rules, and they can likewise chose to de224
list. But this argument does little to justify a policy stance that discourages foreign access to the U.S. capital markets when free access to the U.S.
225
markets ultimately benefits the U.S. economy as well.
Indeed, the high price of SOX compliance for foreign companies causes American stock exchanges to suffer diminished appeal with foreign issu226
ers. Several powerful companies, such as Japanese Daiwa, German
Porsche, and UK Benfield Insurance have delayed listing on the NYSE due
227
to SOX, even after the SEC exemptions were introduced.
On the other
hand, competitive foreign exchanges, such as the London Stock Exchange
(LSE) and Euronext are emerging as a welcoming alternative for foreign
228
issuers spooked by the excessive requirements of SOX.
a) The U.S. Should Exercise Restraint Based on Principles of International Law and Comity. Foreign commentators have noted, on one hand,
that SOX is tailor-made to respond to American problems and violates principles expressed in multilateral agreements, such as NAFTA, Bilateral
229
Agreements (BITs), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). A better
approach to promoting compliance with acceptable reporting standards may
have been, not to pass new legislation through Congress, but to negotiate
Mutual Recognition Agreements to achieve the same objectives, thereby
230
avoiding potential interference with foreign sovereignty.
Along the same reasoning, others advocate for the SEC to adopt a
pragmatic approach to SOX extraterritorial reach, realizing that multiple
provisions are in direct conflict with foreign law. Under principles of comity, such a situation suggests enforcement restraint, and the author recommends that the SEC grant relief to foreign issuers through a situation231
specific no action process. This approach is favored because it would

223

Id.
Id.
225 Id.
226 Ian L. Shaffer, An International Train Wreck Caused in Part by a Defective Whistle: When the
Extraterritorial Application of SOX Conflicts with Foreign Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1829, 1845
(2006).
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Maria Pia Belloni, Il Sarbanes-Oxley Act il Business-Lawyer e la Multidisciplinary Practice
(MDP). I Commenti della Dottrina Statunitense e la Reazione Europea. Qualcosa di Nuovo Nella Sfera
di Cristallo?[U.S Doctrinal Comments and The European Reaction. Anything New in the Crystal Ball?]
Riv. Ital. Dir. Pubbl. Comunitario 417, 430 (2005) (reflecting on the consequences of the American
discipline of foreign issuers with particular reference to the European Union, and positing that SOX may
be too high of a barrier against financial scandals).
230 Id. at 431.
231 Shaffer, supra note 226, at 1873-74.
224
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create an atmosphere of regulatory cooperation, as opposed to regulatory
alienation with foreign governments and companies, which will ultimately
benefit U.S. investors. This would promote the retention of foreign issuers,
while maintaining the cooperation threads that are essential in enforcing
232
securities regulations abroad in the global market. This approach would
also be a viable alternative to both strict enforcement, which may prove
contentious, if not impossible, and to the likewise counterproductive approach of a blanket exceptive relief, which would subvert the purposes of
233
the Act.
b) The U.S. Should Exercise Restraint Based on Structural Differences
Between Domestic and Foreign Corporate Governance. Unmitigated extraterritorial reach, besides breaking with traditional international law principles and canons of construction, produces additional challenges. Due to
differences in the bases of corporate structure and governance in foreign
countries, conflicts with related laws that SOX is, of course, not anticipating or taking into account may affect the operation of subsidiaries of multinationals listed with the SEC as well as foreign issuers in general. At the
risk of stating the obvious, the philosophical and ideological differences
underlying foreign legal and economic systems make many domestic constructs and concepts inapplicable or not susceptible of comprehension
abroad, even after thoughtful translation and even though they may be perfect for the place of origin. Uncertainties and misapprehensions follow. It
is indeed overly simplistic to think that mere transplantation of rules from a
different legal environment may successfully curb incentives to engage in
misconduct in a different system. The idea of using stopgaps—such as the
lawyers as gatekeeper—as an effective tool to investigate and prevent corporate malfeasance the world over is an example of this one-size-fits-all
mentality.
Corporate structure and governance, just like the legal and social orders, tend to reflect the culture they originate into, a nation’s values. For
example, the principles of individual accountability and independence in
corporate governance, which are presumed for the applicability of SOX and
for it to achieve its purposes, directly clash with corporate governance
norms in Germany or in Japan. These countries boast a significant numerical presence of SEC-listed organizations, and are founded on collective
234
decision making and pervasive employee participation in management.
Consequently, Section 301 of SOX, geared at protecting the independence
of the audit committee, contrasts with civil law regulatory systems based on
a dual-board system composed of a management board, which does not

232
233
234
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have independent directors, and a supervisory board, which includes em235
ployees and union representatives.
Another illustration of the difficulty in making rules that cross jurisdiction, and of the inherent challenges in extending domestic norms to foreign settings, is the meaning of specific terms, such as fiduciary duty . The
concept of fiduciary duty does not quite translate to identify the same no236
tion in many civil law countries. In common law countries, the duty of
care refers to the prudence that managers are expected to exercise in carrying out supervision and decision-making. It has been refined by U.S. courts
237
for the protection of investors in multiple corporate situations. By contrast, the concept of fiduciary duty is not as refined in civil law countries
where different methods of police management are in place, such as state
interest in major corporations, with ensuing government controls not impli238
cating the courts.
c) SOX may Exert More Influence Internationally by its Persuasiveness. The U.S. could attain the goal of influencing legislation internationally by the sheer persuasiveness of many SOX rules and the purposes underlying them, since many countries are looking for guidance in devising and
implementing their own corporate reforms. Indeed, many countries around
the world have experienced problems of corporate governance and have
been struggling with reforming their own corporate governance rules for
239
quite some time.
It stands to reason that most countries would look to
U.S. legislation, fairly well developed in this area, for guidance.
In the U.S., SOX represented a departure from the traditional approach
of securities regulations, bringing under the federal umbrella areas of law
240
heretofore left to non-federal fora.
Indeed, federal law was historically
aimed at protecting capital markets via registration, financial disclosure
requirements and anti-fraud provisions embodied in the Securities Act of
1933 and the Security and Exchange Act of 1934, while corporate entities
were traditionally organized under state law, and the accounting and legal
241
professions were under self-regulation.
The dynamics of the corporate
scandals of large proportions, which ultimately precipitated swift legislative
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2003, Gazz. Uff., 22 Gennaio 2003, n. 8/L. Italy experienced its share of corporate scandals resulting in
enormous losses to investors with the fall of companies such as Parmalat and Cirio. See Painter, supra
note 128.
240 Shirley, supra note 185, at 524.
241 Id.
236

2008]

Reporting Rules for U.S. and International Lawyers

495

reaction, brought into sharp focus the fact that the corporate attorneys and
accountants involved failed to identify and report corporate misconduct,
and led Congress to conclude that basic principles and practices of corporate governance for public companies had to be put in place at the federal
242
level. It was a matter of national economic security.
While the U.S was struggling with its own corporate debacles, many
countries in the industrialized world were faced with the sudden fall of corporate giants under the weight of elaborate frauds, ultimately affecting the
investing public. Many foreign countries have undergone and are undergoing sweeping reforms. For example, in Italy, the entire legislative structure underlying business organizations has been reformulated and modernized during a legislative process that started in 2001 and entered into effect
243
in 2004. Likewise, Spain’s corporate environment, traditionally accused
of being dominated by a “clubby atmosphere,” has been changing dramati244
cally in recent years. A corporate reform, started in the 1990s, finally was
245
passed into law in 2003. Even though the legal reform may not find instantaneous application, while questions remain open about its enforceability, Spain is said to have embraced the post-Enron era by undertaking a
246
transformation under the guiding principle of transparency. The engine
that drives transformation of corporate law and corporate governance rules
and practices throughout Europe is not the regulators, but globalization and
247
the demands of the global marketplace.
At this juncture, while legal and economic commentators criticized the
bold moves of the U.S. federal government in its pretenses vis-à-vis the
global marketplace, SOX quickly became the object of just as much analysis geared at understanding its structure, purposes, efficiencies, and at identifying those concepts, methods, and rules that could indeed be reproduced
248
SOX beor used as a model for foreign legal and regulatory schemes.
came, in fact, one of the most studied pieces of U.S. federal legislation in
recent years, and presently seems to provide, for better or for worse, the

242

Id. at 525.
Id. at 524.
244 David Hechler, Market Report Spain: The Spanish Revolution, CORPORATE COUNSEL, Vol. 05,
Issue 9 (2005).
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Luca Condosta, Adeguamento al Sarbanes Oxley Act: Metodologia, Problematiche e Opportunitá, [Compliance with SOX: Methodology, Problems and Opportunities] 19 AMMINISTRAZIONE &
FINANZA 13 (2006) (examining the compliance challenges for foreign corporations listed in the NYSE
imposed by Section 404 of SOX within the deadline of 2006 while not omitting an indication of the
principal opportunities: increased transparency, the opportunity to conduct an internal evaluation of the
business methodologies and processes, and the opportunity to improve accounting methodologies).
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lexicon of corporate governance models globally.
In this somewhat
forced U.S. federal law mania, the SOX regulations affecting lawyers have
taken lesser relief as compared to rules affecting the accounting profession
and the role of corporate executives in the evolution of corporate law
worldwide because a comparatively smaller number of SOX provisions
relate to attorneys, and the SEC final rules have somewhat lessened the
original potential bite of the reporting dispositions.
B. SOX and the Foreign Bar- Problems of Interpretation of U.S. Rules
Abroad
Foreign attorneys are ill-equipped to evaluate the meaning of U.S. law
to make an educated decision regarding whether they personally fall within
the purview of the rule, and whether the conduct they are faced with falls
within the reporting rules. They are required to navigate a “legal mine250
field,” an interconnected multiplicity of legal issues, legal definitions, and
processes they are perforce not familiar with.
1. The Non-Appearing Foreign Attorney
The first subject area where the foreign attorney is likely to get con251
fused is the safe harbor provision of the SEC rules. Who is the nonappearing foreign attorney, and how does the foreign lawyer make a determination as to whether the SEC professional conduct rules apply to him or
his firm? A non-appearing foreign attorney is an attorney:
(1) who is admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction outside of the
United States; (2) who does not hold himself or herself out as practicing, and does not give legal advice regarding, United States Federal
securities or other law . . .; and (3) who: (i) conducts activities that
would constitute appearing and practicing before the Commission only incidentally to . . . the practice of law in a jurisdiction outside the
252
United States . . . .
The last qualification in the rules, the safe harbor for the foreign attorney appearing “only incidentally,” was introduced in response to feedback
253
during the comment phase of the rulemaking process. Likewise, a further
qualification that limits applicability of the rules to the foreign attorney who
249 See, e.g., Francesco Denozza, Le Regole della Globalizzazione tra (Pretesa) Efficienza e (Finti)
Mercati, [The Rules of Globalization between (Feigned) Efficiency and (Fake) Markets] 33.2
GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 167, 174 (2006) (recognizing that there is a tendency towards a unified model of corporate governance across different legal systems).
250 Greene, supra note 54, at 837.
251 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(j)(1)-(3) (2003).
252 Id.
253 Greene, supra note 54, at 831.
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appears before the SEC in consultation with an attorney licensed to practice
254
in the U.S. was introduced during rulemaking. Also, a foreign attorney
does not have to comply if compliance is prohibited by applicable foreign
255
law. It bears noting that the originally proposed rule did not distinguish
between the obligations of domestic and foreign attorneys, and the SEC
specifically requested comments from attorneys in foreign jurisdictions and
attorneys subject to foreign law because it realized that the rules could sub256
ject foreign lawyers to conflicting standards and obligations.
Even though the rule seems rather straightforward, the only simple determination is the first, namely, whether the attorney is admitted to practice
in a foreign country. After that, the rule is structured in terms that hold
meaning only by reference to American legal theories, even though specifically directed at regulating safe harbors for the foreign legal practitioner.
Indeed, it is unlikely that a foreign attorney would be able to evaluate the
meaning of the phrase “holding themselves out” as practicing in the U.S.,
257
while the rule provides no guidance on the subject.
Likewise, the rule
does not give guidance as to the circumstances that would qualify the practice in front of the SEC as incidental or how much cooperation with a U.S.
258
lawyer would either include or exempt the foreign lawyer from the rule.
Many foreign firms that sent in comment letters to the SEC during the
comment phase expressed concern, and requested that non-U.S. attorneys
be exempted altogether, while others asked that the SEC consider the poten259
tial for conflict and exempt foreign attorneys in the interim. In the end,
the SEC rejected all notions of exempting foreign attorneys altogether, recommending that those concerned about whether they fall within the purview of the rules should simply seek the advice of U.S. counsel. The SEC
took the position that the rule is clear regarding what is outside of the definition of “appearing and practicing.” Based on § 205.2(a), the simple preparation of a document that may be included as an exhibit into an SEC filing
does not constitute “appearing and practicing” before the Commission unless “the attorney has notice that the document will be filed with or submitted to the SEC, and he or she provided advice on [U.S.] securities law in
260
preparing the document.”

254

17 C.F.R. § 205.2(j)(3) (i)-(ii) (2003).
Id. § 205.6(d).
256 Greene, supra note 54, at 831.
257 Harper, supra 137, at 141.
258 Id.
259 Greene, supra note 54, at 831.
260 Id. at 832; 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(1)(iii) (2003) (specifying that to be considered appearing and
practicing in front of the SEC, mere preparation of a document does not suffice unless the attorney has
notice that it will be filed, submitted or incorporated in other document to be filed or submitted to the
SEC).
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2. When is Reporting Required?
Another aspect where confusion is likely, regarding the applicability of
the rules to foreign attorneys, is in determining under what circumstances
the reporting requirement is triggered. As noted earlier, up-the-ladder reporting is required when there is credible evidence of a material violation
by the issuer of U.S. federal or state securities law, or a material breach of
fiduciary duty or other similar violation; the standard is whether a prudent
and competent attorney is reasonably likely to become aware of the materi261
al violation. Foreign attorneys are likely to lack the professional expertise
to determine under what circumstances the conditions of compliance with
262
the rule are met.
It is clear that the rule does not apply to violations of foreign law; ra263
ther, it is triggered by the violation of U.S. federal or state law. But clarity
ends there. For example, the SEC purposely left the definition of the word
“material” open, to be defined by reference to established federal law, unlikely to be at the fingertips of any foreign attorney, which defines material
violation as “conduct or information about which a reasonable investor
264
The
would want to be informed before making an investment decision.”
definition is not necessarily free from ambiguities for the domestic practitioner either.
Another issue of confusion, which ties in with the safe harbor provisions, as opposed to those instances when reporting up-the-ladder may be
required, is exclusion from the rule if compliance would expose the foreign
265
lawyer to sanction or other prohibition by foreign law. Here, SEC compliance requirements would seem to extend as far as allowed by foreign
266
law.
The next issue relates to the concept of sufficient evidence. Section
307 and rule 205 require the attorney to report evidence of material violation. As noted above, the standard is reasonable likelihood, a conclusion of
preponderance of the evidence based on a factual analysis that may be problematic for a U.S. attorney, and that is likely to be even more problematic
for the foreign attorney not accustomed to the American legal standards of
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing, and beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, unpredictability in the enforcement of Section 307 and
rule 205 can unduly raise the fear of liability and produce an environment
261

Harper, supra note 137, at 148.
Id.
263 Greene, supra note 54, at 834.
264 Id. at 835.
265 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(d) (2003) (exempting the foreign attorney from compliance “to the
extent that . . . [it] is prohibited by applicable foreign law”).
266 Id.
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where shareholders and the public receive even less protection in the inter267
national arena. The uncertain reach and enforcement of the rules can
cause the international corporate client to seek out the services of an American lawyer with whom candid and ongoing communication is likely to be
dampened by language and cultural barriers. On the other hand, a lawyer
faced with perceived strict rules may over-report, thus chilling the flow of
information necessary to his function as a lawyer and his newly appointed
268
duty of roving investigator. In sum, as applicable to the foreign bar, due to
overlapping norms, uncertainty of application, and misapprehension of the
law, the reporting rules can have an even higher counter-productive effect
than with the domestic bar.
3. Supervising Attorneys
The rules related to the responsibility of supervising attorneys are also
relevant for the attorney of foreign issuers. A supervising attorney is one
who supervises or directs another attorney appearing and practicing before
269
Based on MRPC R. 5.1(b) and
the SEC in representation of an issuer.
(c)(1) and SEC rules §§ 205.4 and 205.5, when the subordinate attorney
reports evidence of a material violation to the supervisory attorney, the latter becomes responsible to comply with the reporting requirements of §
270
205.3.
If the supervising attorney provides direction to the subordinate,
albeit only in matters related to the subordinate attorney’s appearance be271
fore the SEC, he would qualify as a supervising attorney. The potential
implications for foreign issuers are significant since any foreign attorney of
an issuer is in fact supervising a U.S. attorney “appearing and practicing”
before the SEC, and therefore shares responsibility, at least to a certain ex272
tent, regarding reporting compliance.
4. Discipline and Sanctions
The discipline and sanction provisions of the rules start by saying that
attorneys who violate § 205 are subject to the civil penalties and remedies
applicable for violation of U.S. federal securities laws in an action brought
273
by the SEC. The right of action under the rules belongs to the SEC only,
as no private right of action is admitted against attorneys or issuers based
267 Harper, supra note 137, at 163; Greene, supra note 54, at 847 (stating that turning lawyers into
watchdogs may end up causing the issuer to become more secretive and break even more laws by ignorance than they ever did intentionally).
268 See id. at 848.
269 17 C.F.R. § 205.4(a) (2003).
270 Greene, supra note 54, at 841-42.
271 Id. at 842.
272 Id.
273 17 C.F.R § 205.6(a) (2003).
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on the further clarifications provided in § 205.7, which resolved the debate
previously left open by the rules. However, § 205.6(b) specifies that an attorney appearing and practicing before the SEC is subject to the disciplinary authority of the SEC even though he may simultaneously be subject to
274
discipline for the same conduct where the attorney is admitted to practice.
A foreign attorney could be subject to discipline by the SEC and the disciplinary authority of his home country imposing contrasting duties and requiring him to choose which to violate (or to comply with) if it were not for the
later introduced § 205(d), which provides that “an attorney practicing outside of the United States shall not be required to comply with the requirements of this part to the extent that such compliance is prohibited by appli275
cable foreign law.” Still, the foreign attorney is required to comply with
the SEC rules to the maximum extent permitted by the foreign law applica276
ble to him.
The foreign bar is still concerned about the applicability of SOX rules
of professional responsibility, especially in relation to the trend for lawyers
to be invested with increasingly essential functions in business operations,
including strategic planning, solving business problems, and advising on
277
risk management. Overall, the most lamented negative repercussion so far
is more time spent on studying regulations, more time spent on fulfilling
reporting requirements, and in general more paperwork, with enormous
expenditure of resources for the issuer in attorneys’ time and executive in278
vestigative time.
C. Foreign Responses to Corporate Scandals
Different nations have adopted a variety of approaches to the challenges of transparency and accountability of corporations to their constituents, and there have been a variety of reactions to the recent financial debacles, large and small. The idea of enlisting corporate lawyers for the unenviable task of policing their clients has occurred in other contexts, although not to the extent envisioned by SOX, which seems to be peculiar to
the U.S. approach.
1. A Lighter Hand: the European Union (E.U.) Legislation
While the U.S. decided to federalize corporate governance rules, the
E.U., facing similar challenges to investors’ confidence after corporate
scandals of similar resonance, such as Parmalat and Cirio, considered that
274
275
276
277
278
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codification at the European level was going to have very little impact,
since there is great variance among the member states securities and corporate laws, which are still expected to take many years and much work to
279
harmonize. Europeans take a different view of the potential effectiveness
of a single code to regulate the activities of individuals inside corpora280
tions. In 2001, a group of appointed experts recommended not to attempt
a single code, but to endeavor to promote harmonization of member legislation by promulgating general, non-binding principles and rules to allow
Member States to learn from each other by passing a directive which makes
it mandatory for companies to disclose their governance policies, but leaves
to each Member State the task of specifying the content of such disclo281
sures. In 2003, the European Commission presented an Action Plan for
“Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the
E.U.,” a set of proposals to better coordinate Member State initiatives, establishing a broad E.U. framework but allowing a degree of Member State
282
flexibility in three phases stretching through 2009. In response, many of
the E.U. Member States have since been active in promulgating reforms to
their corporate and societal systems in recent years, tending to bring the
individual country’s legal framework up to par with the global market283
place.
2. Conflicts in Germany
German issuers concerned with the increased costs imposed by SOX
on foreign issuers, and with the fact that many of its provisions are incompatible with German corporate governance mechanisms, postponed listing
284
For example, following SOX, Porsche postponed its
with the NYSE.
NYSE listing and questioned whether it was necessary or advisable for it to
entertain this step, and 24 German companies met to discuss the effects of
285
U.S. law and how it directly conflicts with German law.
The corporate structure in Germany is two-tiered: it is composed of a
management board, which has duties similar to the American BOD, and a
supervisory board. However, unlike in the U.S., there is no CEO to whom
the others report, and it would not make sense to hold any one individual
279 Elias Mossos, Sarbanes-Oxley Goes to Europe: A Comparative Analysis of United States and
European Union Corporate Reforms After Enron, 13 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 9, 10 (2004).
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Maria Camilla Cardilli, Regulation Without Borders: The Impact of Sarbanes Oxley on European Companies, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 785, 821 (2004).
283 See supra Section III.A.2.c.
284 Anapama J. Naidu, Was its Bite Worse than its Bark? The Costs Sarbanes Oxley Imposes on
German Issuers may translate into Costs to the United States, 18 EMORY INT’L L.REV. 271, 273-74
(2004).
285 Falencki, supra note 171, at 1228.
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member of the management board responsible in lieu of the group. This
difference makes compliance with SOX particularly challenging and costly.
3. Corporate Governance Regime in the United Kingdom (U.K.)
Bankers and lawyers in the U.K. believe that SOX does not fit their
corporate governance reality, and that the model of corporate governance
which prevails in the U.K. overlaps with SOX. In fact, many corporate
provisions similar to the ones of SOX have already been enacted and are
systematically implemented, well-defined and complied with, as they have
287
been evolving for over a decade. There is in effect a Code of Corporate
Governance which lists principles and practices for the companies listed on
the London Stock Exchange (LSE); as a supplement, the Smith Rules assist
companies in implementing audit committees, making SOX unnecessarily
288
duplicative.
Further, under the Companies Act of 1985, directors of U.K. companies have a statutory duty to compile accounts that give a true and fair view
of the state of affairs of the corporation and its profits and losses, and they
289
are criminally liable for failure to comply. According to the view of British solicitors, the system is inspired to a “comply or explain” approach and
provides a high level of corporate governance regulation and compliance
with no need to superimpose the largely duplicative, “Draconian and ill
290
thought-out” U.S. law.
4. The Hong Kong Negotiated Solution
Having suffered through a wave of corporate scandals, Hong Kong,
just like the U.S., has examined the role of lawyers and introduced meas291
ures to enlist them in policing corporate governance. Hong Kong actually
started to address the issue back in 1996, several years prior to the U.S.,
when the Hong Kong Law Society and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which defines the
expectations of the Exchange as it pertains to the conduct of solicitors
292
representing listed companies. Then, the Hong Kong Standing Committee on Company Law Reform (SCCLR) released Phase I of its report and
proposed regulations in 2001, and, in the wake of recent scandals, in 2004,

286
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293

the SCCLR issued Phase II of its report on reforms needed. Both countries are experiencing the unintended consequences of their attempts to
ameliorate and monitor corporate governance, albeit with different approaches, by regulating lawyer’s conduct and relying on lawyers as agents
294
of control.
In Hong Kong, solicitors are self-regulated through the Law Society,
roughly similar to the state bar associations in the U.S, which maintains
rules, the Guide to Professional Conduct, similar to the domestic state rules
295
of professional conduct. Unlike the U.S., in Hong Kong, the Law Society
and the Exchange had the foresight to anticipate that lawyers would have a
role to play in corporate securities law violations and to cooperate to pro296
duce the MOU. There are three instances where the conduct of the solicitor would subject him to discipline by the Exchange, as opposed to the Law
Society:
1. Making an untrue representation to the Exchange (knowingly or
recklessly) either per the instruction of the client or directly by the solicitor without reasonable inquiry as to the truthfulness of the same;
2. Knowingly or recklessly facilitating or participating in a breach of
the listing rules;
3. Knowingly or unreasonably failing to advise the clients in relation
297
to the requirements of the listing rules.
Even though it represents an example of cooperation and foresight, the
MOU has not been effective in preventing corporate fraud, stopping solicitors from aiding corporations in defrauding minority shareholders or looting
company resources; and it has never been used in a disciplinary proceed298
ing.
Hong Kong negotiated an enforcement agreement between entities,
while in the U.S., the SEC attempts to strong-arm the attorneys into compliance with disclosure rules. Unfortunately, it seems that both approaches,
while possibly in line with their respective cultures, fail to accomplish the
ultimate goal.
5. Impact on Canadian Lawyers
Since Canada is the largest foreign issuer in the U.S. exchanges, the
impact of the reporting rule on Canadian lawyers becomes particularly rele293
294
295
296
297
298
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299

vant. Canadian lawyers are subject to the rules of professional conduct of
the various provinces and territories where they practice, and only the Law
Society of Ontario, which recently modified its rules to harmonize with the
U.S., imposes mandatory up-the-ladder reporting on corporate attorneys,
300
while all the other codes have permissive rules on the subject. Canadian
lawyers, therefore, may be subject to liability, both under the jurisdiction of
301
the SEC and under their codes of professional conduct.
Canadian codes of professional conduct emphasizing integrity, which
is said to be a unique tradition of Canadian lawyers’ ethics, are characterized by an exhortatory tone and look beyond partisanship to encourage the
302
bar to act in the best interest of the community. On this backdrop, Canadian lawyers subject to the SEC may over-report, causing managers and
officers of the issuers to be guarded about how much information they share
303
with their counsel. If U.S. lawyers are chosen instead, managers and officers of the issuers may refrain from divulging information that may lead
to uncovering misconduct to a lawyer who is less knowledgeable on Cana304
dian custom. Clearly, either option is likely to produce less protection for
305
the investor. Alternatively, both Canadian and U.S attorneys may be on
306
the job.
In this situation, the Canadian attorney benefits from the safe
307
harbor, and only the U.S attorney faces liability for misconduct. The Ca308
nadian attorney may not. Yet another alternative is for issuers to avail
themselves of the help of legal experts who are outside the purview of the
309
rules. In all alternatives, the up-the-ladder reporting rules impose high
transaction costs without yielding the hoped-for result of guaranteeing in310
vestor protection.
IV. WHAT SHOULD FOREIGN LAWYERS DO?
The suggestions for proper compliance for foreign attorneys are relatively simple, yet not easy to implement right away, and definitively not
without cost. Lawyers of foreign issuers should become familiar with U.S.
securities laws and with SOX professional responsibilities rules. Otherwise,
unless they meet the definition of non-appearing, the only way they could
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
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310
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effectively avoid liability is to decline to give advice on U.S. securities or to
seek the support of U.S. counsel any time they get involved in legal analysis which could constitute appearing and practicing in front of the Commis311
sion. The conclusion is supported by the fact that SOX does not define
the meaning of material in regards to material violation, relying, as noted
earlier, on its well-established meaning under federal law. The only way the
foreign attorney can be comfortable in appreciating whether he may be in
312
fact faced with such a situation is to become conversant in securities
laws, SOX provisions, and U.S. federal law in general.
Another solution implicit in the rules is, of course, to retain a U.S. law
firm. Although it may not fully protect from supervisory liability, it definitively places the U.S. legal expertise at the service of the foreign company
listed in the exchange, avoiding misapprehension of the law, and to a large
extent, confusion.
Also, foreign issuers should make sure that their legal department has
a structure characterized by a clear hierarchy and clear definition of responsibilities, so that only “supervising” attorneys are charged with the duty of
up-the-ladder reporting, thereby minimizing the exposure of subordinates
313
and reducing reporting time and effort.
Another suggestion is for general counsel to establish regular meetings
with officers and executives on the subject of potential breaches of law and
duty, promoting understanding and fostering compliance, rather than a men314
tality whereby these meetings only happen in times of crisis where emotions likely run high and everyone is functioning in a reactive mode. This
should actually be part of a process of education for corporate executives
regarding the relevant dispositions to equip them to be more vigilant with
respect to potential evidence of material violations, which should percolate
through the organization via information and procedures for handling receipt of reports and investigation of possible material violations of U.S.
315
securities laws. These suggestions, of course, generate a significant increase in transaction costs, which many foreign issuers take into account
when deciding whether the cost of listing is matched by the rewards of
access to the U.S. capital markets.
V. CONCLUSION
SOX reaches across borders to impose on foreign attorneys duties to
their client-corporations by virtue of the fact that the foreign issuers have

311
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registered with the SEC for the privilege of access to the U.S. capital markets. The U.S. federal government is thus attempting to export a novel and,
as yet, experimental regulatory system, which breaks with an established
tradition of state regulation and self-regulation. SOX professional conduct
norms are understandably resisted by the domestic bar where the remonstrations center around the fact that Section 307 compromises the independence
of the profession, deals a fatal blow to the duty of confidentiality, the pillar
of the attorney-client relationship, and even compromises the foundation of
the adversarial system, intending to deputize the corporate lawyer for the
benefit of the SEC’s investigative needs, and asking him to prioritize the
interests of third parties, as opposed to the interests of his employer, to loyal
and expert legal advice.
SOX rules may have been a well-intentioned part of the grand scheme
of imposing a more responsible behavior on corporate entities vis-à-vis the
investment base and the public in general. However, while imposing on the
bar the superhuman task of serving two masters, the rules do not hold promise to enhance transparency and accountability, or to bring about behavioral
changes inspired to higher ethical and moral standards in the corporate arena. Instead, SOX compliance has been causing an increase in transaction
costs throughout listed companies, an increase in the lawyer’s work, a likely chill in the flow of information to corporate counsel, and has possibly
made counsel less effective in providing legal advice, spotting potential
problems, or persuading the clients to follow legally acceptable courses of
conduct.
These problems are only exacerbated as it pertains to the foreign bar.
Besides the unresolved question regarding the general propriety of extending the SEC’s jurisdiction to the foreign bar, even if only by way of voluntary choice of the foreign issuer to be listed, the U.S. federal rules of conduct for lawyers, already at odds with domestic state rules, are likely to be
even more distant, and therefore in dissonance with foreign rules of professional conduct. The result is to impose contrasting mandates upon foreign
attorneys regarding the same representation, while remaining at odds with
corporate governance schemes in other nations that do not subscribe to corporate structures based on individual responsibility, but embrace collegial
schemes with shared corporate responsibility.
To determine whether he qualifies based on one of the exemptions or
whether he falls squarely under the provision of the rules, the foreign attorney has to wade through a maze of legal definitions peculiar to American
law and with which the foreign practitioner is not likely to be familiar. The
same is true with regard to the determination of which particular conduct
triggers the applicability of up-the-ladder reporting. The logical course of
action is to rely on the support of the American bar, which increases transaction costs for the issuer while not necessarily exempting the foreign lawyer from responsibility under SOX in all cases.

2008]

Reporting Rules for U.S. and International Lawyers

507

Unfortunately, uncertainty of application in overlapping regulatory
frameworks has only been increased by SOX under the guise of promoting
transparency and certainty. The SEC may have recognized that new, controversial, and resisted norms of uncertain effectiveness and untested application are particularly unfit to be exported wholesale. Appropriately, the
refinement of applicability provided by the SEC final rules tones down the
extent of federal imposition on the domestic bar regarding its accountability
as “corporate watchdog.” Even more appropriately, in respect of the territoriality principle and of general rules of unnecessary conflict avoidance and
comity, the SEC final rules have also introduced safe harbor provisions
specifically to exempt the foreign bar to a large extent. However, possible
areas of applicability of the up-the-ladder reporting duties and its draconian
consequences cannot be underestimated by foreign attorneys who become
involved in representing foreign issuers registered with the SEC. The foreign bar is well advised to be cautious.
Likewise, in applying these controversial rules to the foreign bar, the
SEC should take a restrained approach. The SEC should allow the rules’
persuasive force to bring about responses and solutions from foreign countries and the foreign bar, adapted to their own corporate regulatory systems.
This way, the rules might achieve the common goal of cooperation in preventing and curbing gross corporate malfeasance which compromises the
stability of the global market.

